University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 17
Number 3 Copyright Symposium, Part II

Article 6

4-1-1992

Presentation by Steven J. Metalitz, Esq.
Steven J. Metalitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Metalitz, Steven J. (1992) "Presentation by Steven J. Metalitz, Esq.," University of Dayton Law Review: Vol.
17: No. 3, Article 6.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/6

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

PRESENTATION BY STEVEN J. METALITZ,

ESQ.
MR. METALITZ: Thank you. I think Marybeth [Peters] has
given us a very good summary and survey of at least one of the functions of the Copyright Office in this area. As she mentioned, there are a
lot of functions that are performed by the Copyright Office in our system; recordkeeping, establishing records of transfers of copyright, and
acquisition of materials for the Library of Congress. Some of these areas invite controversy in the information industry as well. I am going to
focus on the gatekeeper function that she described in detail.
If the Copyright Office does not entirely bar the courthouse door
to some asserted work that the office refuses to register, it certainly
closes that door most of the way, and one must to have a pretty big
crowbar to open it up again. Also, behaviorally, it is a gatekeeper in the
sense that it is a predictor of how the courts are going to react to
claims of copyright in certain kinds of work. It is not a one-hundred
percent accurate predictor, but it is highly accurate.
I am going to touch on three different points. One is how this gatekeeper function is changing in the post-Feist environment, not just because of Feist but because of other trends that are related to the
database issue. Second, I want to talk a little bit about whether this
function is really necessary, and what other ways there might be to
achieve the goals of copyright protection without this kind of gatekeeping function. My third point really is not directly related to Marybeth's
presentation, but it gives a few reactions from an industry perspective
on Feist and on the question of legislation to react to the Feist decision.
Turning first to the changing function of this gatekeeper role, what
we are seeing here, certainly in the case of many automated databases,
but also in other kinds of work as well, is something that is very different from the kind of work that came in through the door of the Copyright Office in the early days of the twentieth century. When the typewriters were there, the human typewriters, they were simply making a
record of what came in through the door. We are seeing a lot more
works, and databases are one but by no means the only example, where
it is very difficult to extricate the copyrightable and noncopyrightable
elements of the work, all of which are wrapped up in one package. As
someone mentioned yesterday, it takes at least a modicum of creativity
to sort out what is original and what is not in these works. It often
requires a great deal of sweat of the brow on the part both of the examiners and certainly on the part of the applicants, who are faced with
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questions from the Copyright Office that they might not have been
faced with a few years ago.
Quite properly, what the Copyright Office does, of course, is to
shift the burden to the applicant, through this correspondence procedure, to demonstrate or to claim what are the copyrightable elements,
where is the original authorship, whether it is selection or arrangement
authorship, and, if it is coordination authorship, I guess it is up to the
applicant to say so. And I think when you look at the letter that is
reproduced in Marybeth Peter's material, you will see that this can be
the initiation of a rather detailed process that requires the applicant, in
effect, to claim certain elements as copyrightable and disclaim other
elements as noncopyrightable. This is again not limited to the database
sphere. Certainly with other types of claims on some software and the
whole controversy over the digitized typeface and so forth, there is the
same process of claiming and disclaiming, and specifying what is copyrightable and what is not copyrightable. Again, by contrast, with works
of older types of technology, it is more likely to be an all or nothing
proposition.
The degree of specificity in these claims and disclaimers is going to
have some consequences in litigation, and I am not sure we know yet
what those consequences will be. Part of it turns, as Marybeth [Peters]
indicated, on the degree of deference that the courts give to the determinations of copyrightability or copyrightable subject matter and authorship made by the Copyright Office. There are also some interesting
questions, I suppose, about whether a claimant who has gone through
this correspondence procedure and obtained a certificate based on certain claims and implied disclaimers is going to be estopped from making different claims in the litigation. For example, where the Copyright
Office found authorship based on the arrangement of the material, they
are going to proceed on the claim of copyrightable authorship in selection of the material and the claim that the defendant's work infringed
that selection authorship. It is not clear whether this process really
serves the function of narrowing the issues and making it easier for the
courts to decide copyrightability. It may, by contrast, unnecessarily
constrict their examination of the controversies and make it more difficult for them to render an independent determination of
copyrightability.
There was some mention yesterday of the fact that, in effect, what
is happening in these cases is a burden shifting problem; where the
defendant finds it easier to shift the burden back to the plaintiff to
show what is the copyrightable authorship. I guess another way to put
it is that the prima facie effect of the certificate of registration is
weaker in these cases. It is still a prima facie effect and, I suppose, if
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/6
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the defendant says nothing, then the court is very likely to go along
with the Copyright Office if it has registered the work. Perhaps there is
less of a burden of production on the defendant to come forth with
something that bursts that bubble of prima facie effect and throws it
back on the table for the court to decide.
One troubling aspect, or at least questionable aspect, of this whole
process is whether, in fact, the copyright registration process in the
area of these works of new technology, and particularly databases, is
moving more toward a patent-like procedure, an examination procedure
rather than simply a registration procedure. Certainly what goes on in
the Copyright Office now is not examination procedure in the patent
sense, but, by this process of detailed correspondence, identifying and
isolating claims, and impliedly or explicitly disclaiming or denying certain types of assertions of copyrightable authorship, we may be coming
to a more patent-like system. Already at least one court has made the
mistake of confusing the Copyright Office with the patent office. The
decision in the Ashton-Tate case in California, which was soon thereafter rescinded. The court invalidated a copyright altogether because of
the alleged failure of the applicant in the registration process to disclose the derivative work or the works of which assertedly his work was
a derivative. It is probably easier to say that he failed to adequately
disclose the prior art and use that kind of patent terminology. At this
point that Ashton-Tate decision, which was withdrawn, is kind of a
sport on the landscape, but perhaps it is a harbinger of things to come.
As I said, the Copyright Office really does not perform an examination process and certainly Congress did not think that the Copyright
Office was performing an examination process wheri it decided to retain
the gatekeeping function of registration for domestic works at the time
of the 1988 Berne Convention implementation legislation. The copyright examiners in this situation are a corps of very dedicated people.
They are also people that have to process an enormous volume of material and do their best to determine copyrightability or authorship. So,
naturally in an environment like that you are looking for bright lines,
you are looking for hard and fast rules, you are looking for that degree
of certainty; but you also run the risk of prematurely setting some of
the standards, particularly in an area such as the database copyright
area which has been put into flux by the Feist decision. You have the
danger of erecting shibboleths and just finding litmus tests that will
enable you to put the work in one basket or another, which may not
totally reflect the complexity of the issues that a court will later have to
decide.
I should say this search for bright lines is not by any means limited
to
Copyright
Office, and in fact, is probably a worse danger in
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the information industry itself in terms of business planning. No one is
less tolerant of uncertainty than a business person who has to make an
investment decision and wants to know, with as much certainty as possible, what legal protection will be available. I am worried that decisions like the Key Publications case in the Second Circuit, because
they are so. specific and go into a specific factual situation, will be
viewed in the industry as a cookbook for noninfringing competition.
You take one-sixth of your competitor's listings, add a dash of your
own, scramble until ready, and let it set, and you are okay and there is
no infringement there. Maybe that is right. But it strikes me as the
same kind of enterprise as trying to figure out what the bright line rule
-is-how many words you can take from somebody else's work before it
transgresses the bounds of fair use and becomes an infringement. That
is another quantitative measure that people are always looking for and
a lot of myths have grown up around that about how many words can
be taken. There is a holy grail that is being searched for in both cases.
But let me just give you an example of the kinds of standards that
the Copyright Office is applying that need a little further examination,
especially considering the gatekeeper function that the office is playing.
As Marybeth Peters explained, the Copyright Office finds that if there
is an exhaustive compilation, there is no selection authorship. I wonder
.exactly where that comes from. I would submit that it does not at least
solely come from Feist and I imagine it predates Feist in terms of the
Copyright Office practice. I think it is important to remember that in
Feist the finding of no selection authorship was not predicated alone on
the exhaustiveness of the compilation. At least in part, it was a question of who defined the boundaries of the universe within which an exhaustive listing had been made. The Rural Telephone Company could
not claim itself to be the author of that selection criterion because two
other entities were clearly the authors. First, the State of Kansas which
told Rural Telephone Service where, within what geographic boundaries, it would provide telephone service. Second, the subscribers who
decided whether or not to subscribe to telephone service, and whether
or not to request an unlisted number. The universe there was defined
not by Rural, but by somebody else so Rural could not claim to be the
author of it. The fact that it was an exhaustive listing of those subscribers. who met those criteria, that were living within a geographic area
and choosing to have a telephone and not asking for an unlisted number, the exhaustiveness alone was not fatal to the claim.
This is a problem, of course, because there is a difference, I suppose, between selection and selectivity. There can be, I would assert,
some creativity involved in defining the scope of the universe within
which an exhaustive compilation could be made. Certainly from an echttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/6
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onomic point of view those are extremely important compilations. From
the point of view of the social goals of copyright, it is important to
encourage and give incentives for the production of exhaustive compilations. Problems come in because something can be exhaustive within
subjective criteria, which I think everyone would generally agree,
amount to copyrightable authorship. You know, the hundred best restaurants in Phoenix is an exhaustive list of the one hundred restaurants
that I believe are the best ones in Phoenix. But sometimes the seemingly objective criteria also can have a subjective element. If I were to,
for some unknown reason, make a list of the one hundred most expensive restaurants in Phoenix, there is an objective criterion in there, but
there is also subjectivity in how it is applied. Do I just look at the
entrees or am I looking at the price of the total meal, with or without
wine? It is not always as easy as it may appear on the surface to say
that this is an exhaustive list and therefore there is no copyrightable
selection.
The remaining question here on how the gatekeeping function is
changing is, of course, how the courts are going to react to it, whether
they are going to rely more heavily on the Copyright Office to make
these initial determinations in field of databases and compilations, or
whether, perhaps, in the period of flux there will be less deference given
and each court will want to put its own spin on what the Supreme
Court meant in Feist. As Jack McDonald said yesterday, the Court
ducked a lot of the hard questions in Feist. I think many judges will be
interested in putting their own stamp on that. Of course, that is a question of infringement rather than copyrightability per se, but as you can
see, even within the Feist decision, it is not always easy to separate
those two aspects.
From the policy point of view the question is: Are we better off
having these kinds of issues decided independently in an adversary proceeding where the issues can be sharpened and the facts can be laid
out? In the Key Publications case, you know that it was 9,000 listings
in the first directory, 1500 in the second, and you can have a factual
record on how the selection was made, how the arrangement was made
and so forth. Or are we better off having this gatekeeper function playing a very prominent role in determining the outcome when the case
comes to court, a gatekeeping function that is carried out not in an
adversary setting, but through this kind of correspondence procedure
and the best efforts of the Copyright Office examiners?
That leads us to the question of whether this function is really
needed. I do not intend to rehash the arguments that came up in the
late '80s when the United States was preparing to join the Berne Convention
over whether
and to what degree this gatekeeping function is
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compatible with Berne. I am a little tempted to do so in light of the
fact that at least one court, the CNN court in the Eleventh Circuit,
reads that legislative history one hundred eighty degrees around. That
is one of several troubling fallacies in that case but one that probably
deserves a little discussion at some point.
But I would rather ask: Could we have a system that worked to
achieve the goals that we want to achieve without having this gatekeeper function? Would that be a preferable system? I would mention
three areas in which we may have a little bit of a test case for finding
out whether that is a more desirable system or not.
The first one is, as Marybeth Peters pointed out, Berne Convention
works. Works of Berne Convention origin are not required to be registered since the 1988 revision. And that is an interesting option, at least
in theory, when you think about the fairly large, and I suspect growing,
proportion of commercially significant databases that are compiled by
companies of European parentage or of Canadian parentage. I do not
think that includes any of my industry colleagues here, but the fact is
that a lot of the non-American publishers are quite active in certain
fields and could, I suppose, get that courthouse door open without registration, although they would lose some of the other benefits that registration brings, such as statutory damages and so forth. If registration is perceived as too onerous a process, if the gatekeeping function is
performed in an unsatisfactory manner, there could be a temptation to
attribute authorship (and these are nearly all work-for-hire situations,
so it would be possible) to a foreign company that has a Berne Convention nationality. So, that may be more of a theoretical than a practical
option, but it would give us some sense of how this system worked without the gatekeeper function.
The second area: What if misappropriation legislation is enacted?
Obviously that can come in a lot of different flavors, but it could well
be that no registration process would be required. Yet we would still
have the same problem, under preemption, of distinguishing the copyrightable elements from noncopyrightable elements, because, at least
under current preemption standards, you could only protect the
noncopyrightable elements through a misappropriation analysis. Obviously, the preemption standards could be changed, but then I suppose
you might have some election of remedy situation where perhaps certain kinds of acts might infringe copyright and might also violate the
misappropriation standard. And I suppose the plaintiffs then, in trying
to decide which way to proceed, would have to take into account the
fact that in order to obtain the copyright remedies, you would have to
go through this registration process, but that you could obtain the misappropriation remedies without doing so. Obviously that is going to
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/6
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turn on what those particular remedies are, but perhaps the requirement or the lack of requirement of registration will figure in there as
well.
The third area in which we might see how this system works without a gatekeeper depends on the European developments, and I think
those are very interesting. While there is no legislation that has actually been proposed in Congress in the United States and quite frankly I
do not see any on the immediate horizon, the European Commission is
going to unveil its draft directive on protection of databases sometime
within the next few months. Their deadline is at the end of this year
and whether they make that or not, it will not be too long before a
draft directive appears. Although there is very strong support throughout Europe for a copyright approach, and that support was unanimously reflected at a hearing that the Commission held last year, there
is also reason to think that the directive may not come out as simply a
copyright directive.
In Europe, unlike the United States, the hard question, is not the
scope of protection, it is the availability of protection because of the
problem of the different originality standard that applies under the
copyright laws of different European states. A high originality standard, particularly as reflected in the German law, may mean that, unlike the United States, where the vast majority, to use Justice
O'Connor's words, of compilations are going to have copyright protection, and I think that is an accurate prediction, in Europe a somewhat
smaller proportion, less than a vast majority (it remains to be seen how
much less) will fall below that originality standard and will not get
copyright protection. So, there is some possibility that the European
approach will be a multi-tiered approach. There will be copyright protection for compilations that exhibit originality. There will be some cumulative kind of unfair competition, or misappropriation or anti-parasitism protection for copying by competitors of compilations whether or
not they enjoy copyright protection. Then there would also be, as Paul
Sheils touched on, the contractual level of protection, either wide open
or potentially with some limitations in the European setting. But because the preemption issue does not exist in Europe, at least in the
same way it does here, and also incidentally the First Amendment limitations do not exist in Europe in the same way they would here although there could potentially be some freedom of expression limitatibns, there could be cumulative protection and again it is an election of
remedies situation to see which one works the best.
Under the European system, it could be that none of these tiers
require registration, but it could be that one of them does. Copyright
probably
will not, given
Published
by eCommons,
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tion and their interpretation of the formalities issue. But there may be
others, such as misappropriation, that do require some kind of gatekeeper function in order to be effective. So that may be another area in
which we can look at a demonstration project of how the system works
with and without this kind of screening.
I would like to conclude with a word on the industry reaction to
the Feist decision and the question of legislation. As many of you
know, this is not an issue on which the industry has had a monolithic
reaction, either before the Feist decision or since the Feist decision. In
the Information Industry Association, we had active and very vigorous
advocacy on both sides of the issue as far as how the Information Industry Association should participate in the case. With our customary
boldness, we came down squarely in the middle. We figured that way
we can minimize our downside risk. Hopefully we contributed something to the debate. But whether it is termed, as some of our participants have termed it, a question of overprotection versus underprotection, or whether from a business standpoint it is viewed as a threat or a
competitive opportunity, I think it is a common recognition that this is
a two-sided coin. Companies are not only looking at how best to protect
their proprietary assets in the post-Feist environment, but also at what
opportunities are opened to them by the decision. If they have access to
the facts and can compile them in a way that shows original authorship
in selection or coordination or arrangement, then they have a competitive and protectible product on the market.
To me it is not inevitable that there is going to be a proposal for a
federal anti-misappropriation statute, although that certainly could
happen. In the seven and a half months since Feist was decided, no bill
has been introduced, no hearings have been scheduled, and I think the
congressional committees would probably say this issue does not loom
at all large on their radar screens at this point. The reaction of the
industry I think could be contrasted to the reaction to other decisions.
For example, it was very shortly after the Salinger and L. Ron Hubbard decisions that the publishing community decided that legislation
was needed to clarify the fair use status of unpublished works. The fact
that that effort has proved much tougher sledding than may have originally been anticipated may be a lesson that the industry would do well
to heed.
I think there are a few reasons why the industry reaction has been
moderate. First, there is a perception that the Feist decision itself involved a very atypical kind of compilation, and there is some comfort
taken from the statement that very few compilations would be cast out
into the outer darkness of the public domain and open to simple photocopying.
Secondly, of course, is the availability of other remedies, such
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/6
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as contractual protection, in many, although not all, instances. Third,
there has continued to be a reliance upon licensing to obtain information for a database, even in the case of the white pages telephone directories where you can go out and copy them now. Within weeks after
the decision, information crossed my desk about a new CD-ROM product that consisted of scanning white pages onto CD-ROM. That product has proven successful and fills a market need. But at the same time
the licensing agreement, even for telephone directories, is essential if
you want the best possible product. If you want the most up-to-date
listings, you do not want to wait until the directory comes out, you
want to license the tapes of updates immediately, and for. a variety of
other reasons, while you may be able to make a non-infringing product
without a licensing agreement, you are, in most cases, going to make a
better product with a licensing agreement.
Finally I think there is an acute sense of the uncertainties and the
vagaries of the legislative process. It is a truism that in the copyright
field, as in so many other fields, it is virtually impossible to enact legislation without a consensus. Congress is finding it increasingly difficult
to make tough decisions that may disadvantage or may injure a significant segment, even if a majority feels that they may reflect the best
public policy. At least you would want to see a consensus within the
industry and that consensus does not exist yet. Again, the lesson of the
fair use legislation, even the legislation on digital audio taping, indicates that without that kind of very broad consensus, the chances of
legislation are slim. Even with that broad consensus within the industry, it is very difficult in today's environment to enact legislation over
the concerted and coherent opposition of other participants, particularly users, such as librarians, consumer groups, or other users, who
have a stake in the process.
It is not just a question of finding the right bill and drafting it
correctly and dropping it in the hopper. It is a question of building
consensus. That would be a slow process, a very long process, and a
very difficult process. During the months and years ahead industry will
be watching to see whether a consensus emerges about whether that
process needs to be undertaken. Thank you.
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